COUNCIL OF EUROPE

207.  The applicant Government asserted that the living conditions to which the Greek Cypriots who had remained in the north were subjected gave rise to substantial violations of the Convention. They stressed that these violations were committed as a matter of practice and were directed against a depleted and now largely elderly population living in the Karpas area of northern Cyprus in furtherance of a policy of ethnic cleansing, the success of which could be measured by the fact that from some 20,000 Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas in 1974 only 429 currently remained. Maronites, of whom there were currently 177 still living in northern Cyprus, also laboured under similar, if less severe, restrictions.

208.  The applicant Government invoked Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1.

A.  As to the facts established by the Commission
209.  By way of a general submission the applicant Government maintained that the Commission, as regards certain of their complaints, erroneously concluded against the weight of the evidence that there was no violation of the Convention. In the applicant Government’s submission, the Commission’s findings on matters such as restrictions on the importation of books other than school-books, interference with correspondence and denial of access to medical services were not only at variance with the written and oral evidence of witnesses but also with the clear findings contained in the “Karpas Brief” (see paragraph 36 above) and the reviews of the action taken by the “TRNC” authorities to give effect to the proposals for remedying the suffering which resulted for the Greek-Cypriot and Maronite populations from administrative practices of violating their Convention rights. The applicant Government further claimed that witnesses, whose number was regrettably restricted, only had a limited time to recount their experiences to the Commission’s delegates. Furthermore, the applicant Government’s lawyers were only left with negligible time in which to draw out all the relevant facts following the witnesses’ statements.

210.  The applicant Government insisted that the Court have regard to these and other shortcomings in the taking of evidence when reviewing the Commission’s findings. They further submitted that, regarding the plight of the Maronites living in northern Cyprus, the Court should procure and examine the Humanitarian Review drawn up on this community. They observed in this connection that the United Nations Secretary-General offered to release the Review in the proceedings before the Commission. However, the objection of the respondent Government prevented its being included in the case file.

211.  The Court recalls that the Commission established the facts with reference, inter alia, to the oral evidence given by witnesses proposed by both sides. It further recalls that it rejected the applicant Government’s criticism of the manner in which the delegates heard the evidence and reaffirms that the hearing of witnesses was organised in a way which respected the principle of procedural equality between both parties (see paragraphs 110-11 above). It is to be noted in addition that, with a view to its establishment of the facts, the Commission made extensive use of documentary materials including the “Karpas Brief” on the living conditions of the enclaved Greek-Cypriot population in northern Cyprus and the UN Secretary-General’s progress reports on the proposals for remedial action formulated in the Brief.

212.  The Court observes that the applicant Government accept much of the Commission’s findings of fact. Their criticism is directed at certain conclusions which the Commission drew from those facts. For its part, and having regard to the wide-ranging and thorough analysis of the evidence conducted by the Commission, the Court does not consider that there are any exceptional circumstances which would lead it to depart from the facts as established by the Commission. It will, on the other hand, scrutinise carefully whether the facts bear out all of the applicant Government’s complaints. It reiterates that it will do so using the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard of proof including with respect to the alleged existence of an administrative practice of violating the Convention rights relied on (see paragraphs 114-15 above).

213.  As to the applicant Government’s request that the Humanitarian Review dealing with the living conditions of the Maronite community in northern Cyprus be obtained, the Court observes that the respondent Government have not signalled that they have lifted their objection to the release of the document. It observes that, in any event, major aspects of the Review have been made public and have been included in the case file.

214.  The Court notes that the Commission, in its examination of the merits of the applicant Government’s complaints, made an overall assessment of the living conditions of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus from the standpoint of Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention. At the same time, the Commission examined the merits of the complaints about the living conditions under the relevant Convention Article (Articles 2, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1), while addressing in the framework of its global assessment the specific complaints raised by the applicant Government under Article 8 concerning interferences with the right of the Karpas Greek Cypriots to respect for their private and family life, home and correspondence. Having regard to the fact that the applicant Government’s arguments on the latter aspects of Article 8 are interwoven with their broader submissions on the violation of that provision, the Court considers that it is appropriate to discuss those arguments in the context of the living conditions of the Karpas Greek Cypriots seen from the angle of Article 8.

215.  The Court will accordingly follow the Commission’s approach in this regard.

B.  As to the merits of the applicant Government’s complaints
1.  Article 2 of the Convention
216.  The applicant Government maintained that the restrictions on the ability of the enclaved Greek Cypriots and Maronites to receive medical treatment and the failure to provide or to permit receipt of adequate medical services gave rise to a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.

217.  In their submission, the respondent State must be considered, as a matter of administrative practice, to have failed to protect the right to life of these communities, having regard to the absence in northern Cyprus of adequate emergency and specialist services and geriatric care. In support of their submission, the applicant Government observed that aged Greek Cypriots were compelled to transfer to the south to obtain appropriate care and attention.

218.  The Commission found that there had been no violation of Article 2 by virtue of denying access to medical services to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in northern Cyprus. It considered in this respect that, although there may have been shortcomings in individual cases, in general access to medical services, including hospitals in the south, was available to them. In view of this conclusion the Commission did not consider it necessary to examine whether, in relation to this complaint, any domestic remedies which might have been available in the “TRNC” had been exhausted.

219.  The Court observes that an issue may arise under Article 2 of the Convention where it is shown that the authorities of a Contracting State put an individual’s life at risk through the denial of health care which they have undertaken to make available to the population generally. It notes in this connection that Article 2 § 1 of the Convention enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see the L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-III, p. 1403, § 36). It notes, however, that the Commission was unable to establish on the evidence that the “TRNC” authorities deliberately withheld medical treatment from the population concerned or adopted a practice of delaying the processing of requests of patients to receive medical treatment in the south. It observes that during the period under consideration medical visits were indeed hampered on account of restrictions imposed by the “TRNC” authorities on the movement of the populations concerned and that in certain cases delays did occur. However, it has not been established that the lives of any patients were put in danger on account of delay in individual cases. It is also to be observed that neither the Greek-Cypriot nor Maronite populations were prevented from availing themselves of medical services including hospitals in the north. The applicant Government are critical of the level of health care available in the north. However, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine in this case the extent to which Article 2 of the Convention may impose an obligation on a Contracting State to make available a certain standard of health care.

220.  The Court further observes that the difficulties which the Greek?Cypriot and Maronite communities experience in the area of health care under consideration essentially stem from the controls imposed on their freedom of movement. Those controls result from an administrative practice which is not amenable to challenge in the “TRNC” courts (see paragraph 41 above). On that account, the Court considers that the issue of non-exhaustion need not be examined.

221.  The Court concludes that no violation of Article 2 of the Convention has been established by virtue of an alleged practice of denying access to medical services to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in northern Cyprus.

222.  The Court will revert to the applicant Government’s complaint in respect of the alleged interference with access to medical facilities in the context of the overall assessment of compliance with Article 8 of the Convention (see paragraphs 281 et seq. below).

2.  Article 5 of the Convention
223.  The applicant Government maintained that the evidence clearly established that the personal security of the enclaved Greek Cypriots had been violated as a matter of practice. The applicant Government relied on Article 5 of the Convention in this respect, the relevant part of which reads:
“1.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person…”

224.  In the applicant Government’s submission, the Commission was incorrect in its conclusion that this complaint was not borne out by the evidence. The applicant Government asserted that the written and oral testimony of witnesses clearly demonstrated the vulnerability and fear of the enclaved population and the impunity with which those responsible for crimes against the person and property could act. As to the latter point, the applicant Government observed that, although notified of complaints, the police failed to take action and without identification of assailants and suspects civil action, even if remedies were available, was impossible. They stressed that account had to be taken of the fact that the victims of these acts of criminality were aged and that the evidence given by certain witnesses to the Commission’s delegates had to be seen against the background of their fear of retaliation.

225.  The Commission noted that there were no cases of actual detention of enclaved Greek Cypriots during the period under consideration; nor did it find that the allegations of threats to personal security had been substantiated. In these circumstances, no issue as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies fell to be considered. It concluded that there had been no violation of Article 5.

226.  The Court notes that the applicant Government have not claimed that any members of the enclaved Greek-Cypriot population were actually detained during the period under consideration. Their complaint relates to the vulnerability of what is an aged and dwindling population to the threat of aggression and criminality and its overall sense of insecurity. However, the Court considers that these are matters which fall outside the scope of Article 5 of the Convention and are more appropriately addressed in the context of its overall assessment of the living conditions of the Karpas Greek Cypriots seen from the angle of the requirements of Article 8 (see paragraphs 281 et seq. below).

227.  For the above reason, the Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 5 of the Convention.

3.  Article 6 of the Convention
228.  The applicant Government, referring to their earlier arguments on the issue of domestic remedies raised in the context of the preliminary issues (see paragraphs 83-85 above), claimed that Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus were denied the right to have their civil rights and obligations determined by independent and impartial courts established by law. They requested the Court to find a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, which provides as relevant:
“1.  In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law…”

229.  The applicant Government criticised the Commission’s failure to have regard to the essential illegality of the regime under which the “TRNC” courts function. They submitted in this connection that it could not be contended that those courts were “established by law” within the meaning of Article 6 as interpreted in the Court’s case-law. Regrettably, the Commission erroneously considered that the “TRNC” courts had a sufficient legal basis within the “constitutional and legal system of the TRNC”. Furthermore, the Commission overlooked clear evidence which supported the applicant Government’s view that the enclaved Greek-Cypriot population had no faith in the independence and impartiality of the court system and that any rulings which might be given in favour of litigants were rendered meaningless on account of intimidation by Turkish settlers. To this were to be added the facts, firstly, that there was no system of legal aid which could facilitate the bringing of proceedings and, secondly, the authorities themselves did nothing to prevent intimidation by settlers, with the result that court decisions remained unenforceable. Furthermore, due account had also to be taken of the fact that the possibility of taking litigation was frustrated on account of the restrictions imposed on the movement of the enclaved Greek Cypriots and hence on their access to courts. In the applicant Government’s submission, these severe impediments to justice were confirmed by the findings in the “Karpas Brief”.

230.  The Commission found on the facts that Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus were not prevented from bringing civil actions before the “TRNC” courts. In the Commission’s conclusion, the applicant Government had not made out their claim that there was a practice in the “TRNC” of denying access to court.

231.  As to the applicant Government’s claim that “TRNC” courts failed to satisfy the criteria laid down in Article 6, the Commission noted, firstly, that there was nothing in the institutional framework of the “TRNC” legal system which was likely to cast doubt either on the independence and impartiality of the civil courts or the subjective and objective impartiality of judges, and, secondly, those courts functioned on the basis of the domestic law of the “TRNC” notwithstanding the unlawfulness under international law of the “TRNC”’ s claim to statehood. The Commission found support for this view in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Namibia case (see paragraph 86 above). Moreover, in the Commission’s opinion due weight had to be given to the fact that the civil courts operating in the “TRNC” were in substance based on the Anglo-Saxon tradition and were not essentially different from the courts operating before the events of 1974 and from those which existed in the southern part of Cyprus.

232.  The Commission accordingly concluded that, during the period under consideration, there had been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention in respect of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus.

233.  The Court notes that the applicant Government have confined their submissions under this head to the civil limb of Article 6 of the Convention. It recalls in this connection that the first paragraph of Article 6 embodies the right of access to a court or tribunal in respect of disputes over civil rights or obligations which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law; it does not of itself guarantee any particular content for such rights and obligations in the substantive law of the Contracting State (see, inter alia, the Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A, no. 102, p. 70, § 192). Furthermore, a court or tribunal is characterised in the substantive sense of the term by its judicial function, that is to say determining matters within its competence on the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner. It must also satisfy a series of further requirements – independence, in particular of the executive; impartiality; duration of its members’ terms of office; guarantees afforded by its procedure – several of which appear in the text of Article 6 § 1 (see, among other authorities, the Belilos v. Switzerland judgment of 29 April 1988, Series A no. 132, p. 29, § 64).

234.  The Court observes that it is the applicant Government’s contention that the enclaved Greek-Cypriot population is prevented, as a matter of administrative practice, from asserting civil claims before the “TRNC” courts. However this assertion is at variance with the testimony of witnesses heard by the delegates, including witnesses proposed by the applicant Government. It is also contradicted by the written evidence adduced before the Commission. It is clear that Greek Cypriots living in the north have on occasion successfully taken court actions in defence of their property rights (see paragraph 39 above), and they are not barred for reasons of race, language or ethnic origin from using the local courts. The Commission accepted this on the facts and the Court does not dispute the Commission’s conclusion. For the Court, the applicant Government are required to show that the courts have been tried and found wanting. Absent this, it is being asked to speculate on the merits of their claim. Admittedly, the number of actions brought by members of the enclaved population is limited. However, that of itself does not corroborate the applicant Government’s claim, especially if regard is had to the fact that the population is aged and small in numbers and, for reasons of allegiance, perhaps psychologically ill-disposed to invoking the jurisdiction of courts set up by the “TRNC”.

235.  The Court also considers that this conclusion is not affected by the fact that certain matters which may weigh heavily on the daily lives of the enclaved Greek Cypriots are not amenable to challenge in the “TRNC” courts, for example restrictions on their freedom of movement or their right to bequeath property to family members in the south (see paragraphs 40-41 above). However, in the Court’s opinion those measures, whether embodied in policy or “legislation”, are to be addressed from the standpoint of the effectiveness of remedies within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention and their compatibility with other relevant substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. The existence of such measures does not improve the applicant Government’s case concerning the alleged administrative practice of violating Article 6. It recalls in this connection that the applicability of Article 6 is premised on the existence of an arguable cause of action in domestic law (see the above-mentioned Lithgow and Others judgment, p. 70, § 192, and the Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, pp. 16-17, § 36).

236.  As to the applicant Government’s challenge to the very legality of the “TRNC” court system, the Court observes that they advanced similar arguments in the context of the preliminary issue concerning the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the complaints covered by the instant application (see paragraphs 83-85 above). The Court concluded that, notwithstanding the illegality of the “TRNC” under international law, it cannot be excluded that applicants may be required to take their grievances before, inter alia, the local courts with a view to seeking redress. It further pointed out in that connection that its primary concern in this respect was to ensure, from the standpoint of the Convention system, that dispute-resolution mechanisms which offer individuals the opportunity of access to justice for the purpose of remedying wrongs or asserting claims should be used.

237.  The Court observes from the evidence submitted to the Commission (see paragraph 39 above) that there is a functioning court system in the “TRNC” for the settlement of disputes relating to civil rights and obligations defined in “domestic law” and which is available to the Greek-Cypriot population. As the Commission observed, the court system in its functioning and procedures reflects the judicial and common-law tradition of Cyprus (see paragraph 231 above). In its opinion, having regard to the fact that it is the “TRNC domestic law” which defines the substance of those rights and obligations for the benefit of the population as a whole it must follow that the domestic courts, set up by the “law” of the “TRNC”, are the fora for their enforcement. For the Court, and for the purposes of adjudicating on “civil rights and obligations” the local courts can be considered to be “established by law” with reference to the “constitutional and legal basis” on which they operate.
In the Court’s opinion, any other conclusion would be to the detriment of the Greek-Cypriot community and would result in a denial of opportunity to individuals from that community to have an adjudication on a cause of action against a private or public body (see paragraph 96 above). It is to be noted in this connection that the evidence confirms that Greek Cypriots have taken successful court actions in defence of their civil rights.

238.  The Court would add that its conclusion on this matter in no way amounts to a recognition, implied or otherwise, of the “TRNC”’s claim to statehood (see paragraphs 61, 90 and 92 above).

239.  The Court notes that the applicant Government contest the independence and impartiality of the “TRNC” court system from the perspective of the local Greek-Cypriot population. However, the Commission rejected this claim on the facts (see paragraph 231 above). Having regard to its own assessment of the evidence, the Court accepts that conclusion.

240.  For the above reasons, the Court concludes that no violation of Article 6 of the Convention has been established in respect of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus by reason of an alleged practice of denying them a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of their civil rights and obligations.

4.  Article 9 of the Convention
241.  The applicant Government alleged that the facts disclosed an interference with the enclaved Greek Cypriots’ right to manifest their religion, in breach of Article 9 of the Convention which states:
“1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2.  Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

242.  The applicant Government contended that the interference with the concerned population’s right under Article 9 was reflected in the “TRNC” policy of limiting its freedom of movement and thereby restricting access to places of worship. The applicant Government also condemned the failure of the “TRNC” to appoint further priests to the area. They endorsed the Commission’s findings on the facts and its conclusion that there had been a breach of Article 9. They added that a similar breach should be found in respect of the Maronite population living in northern Cyprus on account of the fact that that population also had to contend with restrictions on its right to visit and tend to its holy places in the northern part of Cyprus.

243.  The Commission observed that the existence of a number of measures limited the religious life of the enclaved Greek-Cypriot population. It noted in this respect that, at least until recently, restrictions were placed on their access to the Apostolos Andreas Monastery as well as on their ability to travel outside their villages to attend religious ceremonies. In addition, the “TRNC” authorities had not approved the appointment of further priests for the area, there being only one priest for the whole of the Karpas region. For the Commission, these restrictions prevented the organisation of Greek Orthodox religious ceremonies in a normal and regular manner and amounted to a breach of Article 9 of the Convention. In the Commission’s view, there existed no effective remedies in respect of the measures complained of.

244.  The Commission accordingly concluded that during the period under consideration there had been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention in respect of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus.

245.  The Court accepts the facts as found by the Commission, which are not disputed by the applicant Government. It has not been contended by the applicant Government that the “TRNC” authorities have interfered as such with the right of the Greek-Cypriot population to manifest their religion either alone or in the company of others. Indeed there is no evidence of such interference. However, the restrictions placed on the freedom of movement of that population during the period under consideration considerably curtailed their ability to observe their religious beliefs, in particular their access to places of worship outside their villages and their participation in other aspects of religious life.

246.  The Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention in respect of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus.

247.  The Court notes that the applicant Government have requested it to make a similar finding in respect of the Maronite community living in northern Cyprus. However, it considers that the evidence before it is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that members of this community were prejudiced to the same extent as the Greek-Cypriot population in the north in the exercise of their right to freedom of religion. It finds therefore that no violation of Article 9 has been established in respect of the Maronite population living in northern Cyprus.

5.  Article 10 of the Convention
248.  The applicant Government asserted that the “TRNC” authorities engaged in excessive censorship of school-books, restricted the importation of Greek-language newspapers and books and prevented the circulation of any newspapers or books whose content they disapproved of. In their submission, these acts violated as a matter of administrative practice the right of the enclaved Greek Cypriots to receive and impart information and ideas guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, which provides:
“1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2.  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

249.  The applicant Government approved the Commission’s finding that school-books destined for Greek-Cypriot children in the north were subject to excessive measures of censorship. However, in their submission the Commission had failed to give due regard to the ample evidence confirming that Greek-language books and newspapers were censored and confiscated by the “TRNC” authorities. The applicant Government stated that it would be stretching credulity to accept that these authorities censored school-books, however innocent their content, but permitted the unrestricted importation of other categories of books. The applicant Government relied on the oral affirmation of certain witnesses heard by the Commission’s delegates that books, like newspapers, had to be surreptitiously taken into northern Cyprus for fear of confiscation.

250.  The Commission found a violation of Article 10 in so far as the Turkish-Cypriot authorities had, during the period under consideration, censored or rejected the distribution of a considerable number of school-books on the ground that their content was capable of fostering hostility between the ethnic communities in northern Cyprus. The Commission noted that the books which had been censored or rejected concerned subjects such as Greek language, English, history, geography, religion, civics, science, mathematics and music. Even having regard to the possibility that such books contained materials indicating the applicant Government’s view of the history and culture of Cyprus, the impugned action failed to comply with the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 10. In the Commission’s view there were no remedies which would have allowed parents or teachers to contest the action taken.

251.  On the other hand, the Commission did not find it established on the evidence that restrictions were imposed on the importation of newspapers or Greek-Cypriot or Greek language books other than school-books, or on the reception of electronic media. As to the absence of a newspaper distribution system in the Karpas area, the Commission observed that it had not been informed of any administrative measures preventing the establishment of such a system.

252.  The Court recalls that it has accepted the facts as established by the Commission (see paragraph 212 above). On that understanding it confirms the Commission’s finding that there has been an interference with Article 10 on account of the practice adopted by the “TRNC” authorities of screening the contents of school-books before their distribution. It observes in this regard that, although the vetting procedure was designed to identify material which might pose a risk to inter-communal relations and was carried out in the context of confidence-building measures recommended by UNFICYP (see paragraph 44 above), the reality during the period under consideration was that a large number of school-books, no matter how innocuous their content, were unilaterally censored or rejected by the authorities. It is to be further noted that in the proceedings before the Commission the respondent Government failed to provide any justification for this form of wide-ranging censorship, which, it must be concluded, far exceeded the limits of confidence-building methods and amounted to a denial of the right to freedom of information. It does not appear that any remedies could have been taken to challenge the decisions of the “TRNC” authorities in this regard.

253.  The Court notes that the applicant Government consider that the Commission erred in its assessment of the evidence in respect of other categories of Greek-language books as well as newspapers. It has given careful consideration to the matters relied on by the applicant Government. However, the Court does not find that the evidence of individual cases of confiscation at the Ledra Palace check-point adduced before the Commission and highlighted by the applicant Government in their memorial and at the public hearing substantiate their allegations with reference to the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard of proof.

254.  The Court finds therefore that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus in so far as school-books destined for use in their primary school were subject, during the period under consideration, to excessive measures of censorship.

6.  Article 11 of the Convention
255.  The applicant Government asserted that their complaint under this head related to their claim that the Karpas Greek Cypriots were victims of interferences with their right to freedom of assembly, in breach of Article 11 of the Convention, which provides:
“1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2.  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”

256.  The applicant Government contended that the Commission had failed to give due weight to the evidence of the respondent State’s long-standing policy of impeding the enclaved population’s right to take part in organised or ad hoc gatherings. They maintained that the Commission erroneously found that impediments to bi-communal meetings only occurred as from the second half of 1996 and were thus outside the scope of the case. The applicant Government argued that these impediments had in fact been continuing since 1974 on account of the respondent State’s general and restrictive policy in the area of freedom of movement. They maintained that their claim was borne out by the UN Secretary-General’s observations on the measures being implemented by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites located in the northern part of Cyprus (UN document S/1995/1020, Annex IV, 30 November 1995). By way of an example of restrictions on the right to freedom of assembly during the period under consideration, the applicant Government observed that the Turkish-Cypriot authorities, on 13 November 1994, refused permission for a Greek singer to give a concert in the Karpas region.

257.  The applicant Government further complained that the administrative practice at issue also resulted in a violation of Article 8, given that the Greek-Cypriot and Maronite populations were prevented from freely foregathering, meeting or assembling either outside their villages in the “TRNC” or by crossing the cease-fire line to the buffer-zone, or by visiting the free area.

258.  The Commission proceeded on the understanding that the applicant Government’s essential complaint under Article 11 concerned an alleged violation of the right of the population concerned to freedom of association in the sense of founding or joining associations or taking part in the activities of associations with a minimum organisational structure, to the exclusion of social contacts. The Commission found on the evidence that, during the period under consideration, there was no restriction on any aspect of the right as defined. As to impediments to the participation of enclaved Greek Cypriots in bi-communal events organised by the United Nations, the Commission noted that UN documents mentioned impediments having been placed in the way of inter-communal meetings as from the second half of 1996. However, given that these events were based on distinct facts occurring after the date of the admissibility decision, any complaints based thereon could not be entertained.

259.  Having regard to its conclusion that there had been no violation of the right of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus to freedom of association, the Commission considered that it was unnecessary to examine whether any available remedies had been exhausted in respect of the applicant Government’s allegations.

260.  The Court observes that the matters raised by the applicant Government are essentially issues of fact which have been carefully examined by the Commission in the context of the fact-finding procedure. It observes that on the basis of the evidence analysed the Commission found it impossible to conclude that during the period under consideration there was any interference by the “TRNC” authorities with attempts by Greek Cypriots to establish their own associations or mixed associations with Turkish Cypriots, or interference with the participation of Greek Cypriots in the activities of associations (see paragraph 258 above). The Court accepts the Commission’s finding and would add that the evidence does not allow it to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that an administrative practice of violating the right of the enclaved Greek Cypriots to freedom of association existed during the reference period.

261.  Like the Commission, the Court also considers that its conclusion does not require it to examine whether any available domestic remedies have been exhausted in relation to these complaints.

262.  As to the applicant Government’s complaints in respect of an alleged practice of imposing restrictions on Greek Cypriots’ participation in bi-communal or inter-communal events during the period under consideration, the Court considers, having regard to the subject-matter of the events relied on, that it is more appropriate to consider them from the standpoint of Article 8 of the Convention. It will do so in the context of its global assessment of that Article (see paragraphs 281 et seq. below).

263.  The Court concludes that no violation of Article 11 of the Convention has been established by reason of an alleged practice of denying Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus the right to freedom of association.

7.  Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
264.  The applicant Government complained that Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in northern Cyprus were victims of violations of their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They contended that the authorities of the respondent State unlawfully interfered with the property of deceased Greek Cypriots and Maronites as well as with the property of such persons who decided to leave permanently the northern part. Furthermore, landowners were denied access to their agricultural land situated outside a three-mile radius of their villages. The applicant Government requested the Court to confirm the Commission’s conclusion that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated in these respects.

265.  In a further submission, the applicant Government pointed to their claim that third parties interfered with the property of the persons concerned, whether situated inside their villages or beyond the three-mile zone and that the “TRNC” authorities acquiesced in or tolerated these interferences. In the applicant Government’s view, the evidence adduced before the Commission clearly demonstrated that the local police did not, as a matter of administrative practice, investigate unlawful acts of trespass, burglary and damage to property, contrary to the respondent State’s positive obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They observed with regret that the Commission had failed to find a violation despite the existence of substantial evidence of an administrative practice. The applicant Government requested the Court to depart from the Commission’s finding on this particular complaint.

266.  The Commission accepted on the evidence that there was no indication that during the period under consideration there were any instances of wrongful allocation of Greek-Cypriot property to other persons and that the property of resident Greek Cypriots was not treated as “abandoned property” within the meaning of “Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution” (see paragraph 184 above). It observed in this connection that the local courts had ruled in favour of a number of Greek Cypriots who claimed that their properties had been wrongfully allocated under the applicable domestic “rules”. However, the Commission did find it established that Greek Cypriots who decided to resettle in the south were no longer considered legal owners of the property which they left behind. Their situation was accordingly analogous to that of displaced persons (see paragraph 187 above) and, as with the latter, there were no remedies available to them to contest this state of affairs.

267.  The Commission was not persuaded either that heirs living in southern Cyprus would have any realistic prospects of invoking remedies before the “TRNC” courts to claim inheritance rights to the property of deceased Greek Cypriots situated in the north. In the Commission’s opinion, the respondent Government had not shown to its satisfaction that such property would not be considered “abandoned” in application of the relevant “rules”. In any event, the very existence of these “rules” and their application were, for the Commission, incompatible with the letter and spirit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

268.  As to the criminal acts of third parties referred to by the applicant Government, the Commission considered that the evidence did not bear out their allegations that the “TRNC” authorities had either participated in or encouraged criminal damage or trespass. It noted that a number of civil and criminal actions had been successfully brought before the courts in respect of complaints arising out of such incidents and that there was a recent increase in criminal prosecutions.

269.  The Court notes from the facts established by the Commission that, as regards ownership of property in the north, the “TRNC” practice is not to make any distinction between displaced Greek-Cypriot owners and Karpas Greek-Cypriot owners who leave the “TRNC” permanently, with the result that the latter’s immovable property is deemed to be “abandoned” and liable to reallocation to third parties in the “TRNC”.
For the Court, these facts disclose a continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus in that their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions was not secured in case of their permanent departure from that territory.

270.  The Court further observes that the evidence taken in respect of this complaint also strongly suggests that the property of Greek Cypriots in the north cannot be bequeathed by them on death and that it passes to the authorities as “abandoned” property. It notes that the respondent Government contended before the Commission that a court remedy could be invoked by an heir in order to assert inheritance rights to the property of a deceased Greek-Cypriot relative. The Court, like the Commission, is not persuaded that legal proceedings would hold out any prospects of success, having regard to the respondent Government’s view in the proceedings before the Commission that the property of deceased Greek Cypriots devolves on the authorities in accordance with the notion of “abandoned” property. It further notes that heirs living in the south would in fact be prevented from having physical access to any property which they inherited.
Accordingly, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has also been breached in this respect, given that the inheritance rights of persons living in southern Cyprus in connection with the property in northern Cyprus of deceased Greek-Cypriot relatives were not recognised.

271.  Concerning the applicant Government’s allegation of a lack of protection for Greek Cypriots against acts of criminal damage to their property, the Court considers that the evidence adduced does not establish to the required standard that there is an administrative practice on the part of the “TRNC” authorities of condoning such acts or failing to investigate or prevent them. It observes that the Commission carefully studied the oral evidence of witnesses but was unable to conclude that the allegation was substantiated. Having regard to its own assessment of the evidence relied on by the applicant Government, the Court accepts that conclusion. It further observes that the “domestic law” of the “TRNC” provides for civil actions to be taken against trespassers and criminal complaints to be lodged against wrongdoers. The “TRNC” courts have on occasion found in favour of Greek-Cypriot litigants. As noted previously, it has not been established on the evidence that there was, during the period under consideration, an administrative practice of denying individuals from the enclaved population access to a court to vindicate their civil rights (see paragraph 240 above).

272.  The Court concludes accordingly that no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has been established by reason of an alleged practice of failing to protect the property of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus against interferences by private persons.
8.  Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

273.  The applicant Government averred that the children of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus were denied secondary-education facilities and that Greek-Cypriot parents of children of secondary-school age were in consequence denied the right to ensure their children’s education in conformity with their religious and philosophical convictions. The applicant Government relied on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, which states:
“No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.”

274.  The applicant Government approved the reasons given by the Commission for finding a violation of the above provision. However, they requested the Court to rule that this provision had also been breached on account of the prevention by the respondent State of appropriate primary-school teaching until the end of 1997. Before that date, the “TRNC” had not permitted the appointment of a primary-school teacher. In the applicant Government’s submission this policy interfered with the right of Greek-Cypriot children to a primary education.

275.  The Commission, with reference to the principles set out by the Court in the Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium (merits) (judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6), observed that the secondary educational facilities which were formerly available to children of Greek Cypriots had been abolished by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. Accordingly, the legitimate wish of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus to have their children educated in accordance with their cultural and ethnic tradition, and in particular through the medium of the Greek language, could not be met. The Commission further considered that the total absence of secondary-school facilities for the persons concerned could not be compensated for by the authorities’ allowing pupils to attend schools in the south, having regard to the fact that restrictions attached to their return to the north (see paragraph 44 above). In the Commission’s conclusion, the practice of the Turkish-Cypriot authorities amounted to a denial of the substance of the right to education and a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

276.  As to the provision of primary-school education in the Greek language, the Commission considered that the right to education of the population concerned had not been disregarded by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities and that any problems arising out of the vacancy for teaching posts had been resolved.

277.  The Court notes that children of Greek-Cypriot parents in northern Cyprus wishing to pursue a secondary education through the medium of the Greek language are obliged to transfer to schools in the south, this facility being unavailable in the “TRNC” ever since the decision of the Turkish?Cypriot authorities to abolish it. Admittedly, it is open to children, on reaching the age of 12, to continue their education at a Turkish or English-language school in the north. In the strict sense, accordingly, there is no denial of the right to education, which is the primary obligation devolving on a Contracting Party under the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (see the Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 23, pp. 25-26 § 52). Moreover, this provision does not specify the language in which education must be conducted in order that the right to education be respected (see the above-mentioned Belgian linguistic judgment, pp. 30-31, § 3).

278.  However, in the Court’s opinion, the option available to Greek-Cypriot parents to continue their children’s education in the north is unrealistic in view of the fact that the children in question have already received their primary education in a Greek-Cypriot school there. The authorities must no doubt be aware that it is the wish of Greek-Cypriot parents that the schooling of their children be completed through the medium of the Greek language. Having assumed responsibility for the provision of Greek-language primary schooling, the failure of the “TRNC” authorities to make continuing provision for it at the secondary-school level must be considered in effect to be a denial of the substance of the right at issue. It cannot be maintained that the provision of secondary education in the south in keeping with the linguistic tradition of the enclaved Greek Cypriots suffices to fulfil the obligation laid down in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, having regard to the impact of that option on family life (see paragraph 277 above and paragraph 292 below).

279.  The Court notes that the applicant Government raise a further complaint in respect of primary-school education and the attitude of the “TRNC” authorities towards the filling of teaching posts. Like the Commission, it considers that, taken as a whole, the evidence does not disclose the existence of an administrative practice of denying the right to education at primary-school level.

280.  Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus in so far as no appropriate secondary-school facilities were available to them.

C.  Overall examination of the living conditions of Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus
1.  Article 8 of the Convention
281.  The applicant Government asserted that the respondent State, as a matter of administrative practice, violated in various respects the right of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus to respect for their private life and home. The applicant Government invoked Article 8 of the Convention.

282.  The applicant Government requested the Court to confirm the Commission’s finding that Article 8 was violated, firstly, on account of the separation of families brought about by continuing restrictions on the right of Greek Cypriots to return to their homes in the north and, secondly, as a result of the effect of the entirety of these restrictions on the enclaved population.

283.  In their further submissions, the applicant Government maintained that the Commission had failed to make an express finding that Article 8 had been breached by virtue of the effect which the various restrictions on freedom of movement of the enclaved Greek Cypriots had during the period under consideration on their right to respect for private life. They highlighted in this connection the restrictions which prevented the enclaved Greek Cypriots from assembling or meeting with other individuals on an informal or ad hoc basis or attending bi-communal meetings or other gatherings (see paragraphs 256-57 above). The applicant Government also contended that a further and separate breach of the right to respect for private life should be found in view of the consequences which the restrictions on movement had on the access of enclaved Greek Cypriots to medical treatment (see paragraphs 216-17 above). In this connection, the applicant Government observed that the requirement to obtain permission for medical treatment and the denial of visits by Greek-Cypriot doctors or Maronite doctors of their choice interfered with the right of Greek Cypriots in the north to respect for their private life.

284.  The applicant Government further contended that the evidence before the Commission clearly showed that Article 8 had been breached in the following additional respects: interference by the “TRNC” authorities with the right to respect for correspondence by way of searches at the Ledra Palace crossing-point and confiscation of letters; denial by the same authorities for a lengthy period, and on a discriminatory basis, of the installation of telephones in homes of Greek Cypriots and interception of such calls as they were able to make.

285.  The applicant Government reiterated their view that the respondent State through its policy of colonisation had engaged in deliberate manipulation of the demographic and cultural environment of the “home” of the Greek Cypriots (see paragraph 167 above). They requested the Court to find a breach of Article 8 on that account.

286.  The applicant Government stated in conclusion that the Court should address the Commission’s failure to deal individually with each of the above interferences and to find that they gave rise to separate breaches of Article 8.

287.  The Commission examined the applicant Government’s complaints from a global standpoint while not losing sight of the distinct aspects of that provision (see paragraph 214 above). It found on the facts that the restrictions imposed by the “TRNC” authorities during the period under consideration on the freedom of movement of Greek Cypriots to and from the south had the effect of gravely interfering with the right of the enclaved Greek Cypriots to respect for family life. Furthermore, their movement within the Karpas region, including to neighbouring villages or towns, was accompanied by measures of strict and invasive police control. The Commission noted that visitors to their homes were physically accompanied by police officers who, in certain cases, stayed with the visitors inside the host’s home. In the Commission’s opinion, this administrative practice amounted to a clear interference with the right of the enclaved Greek Cypriots to respect for their private life and home.

288.  The Commission observed that no remedies were available to challenge the measures applied to the enclaved population and that they could not be justified in any manner with respect to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 8.

289.  In view of the above finding the Commission did not consider it necessary to address the merits of the applicant Government’s complaint concerning the alleged effect of the respondent State’s colonisation policy on the demographic and cultural environment of the Greek Cypriots’ homes.

290.  Furthermore, the Commission did not find it established on the evidence that, during the period under consideration, there had been an administrative practice of disregarding the right of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus to respect for their correspondence.

291.  The Commission noted however that, taken as a whole, the daily life of Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus was characterised by a multitude of adverse circumstances, which were to a large extent the direct result of the official policy conducted by the respondent State and its subordinate administration. In the Commission’s view these adverse factors served to aggravate the breach of the enclaved Greek Cypriots’ right to respect for their private and family life and respect for their home.

292.  The Court observes in the first place that the facts as found by the Commission confirm that, during the period under consideration, the right of the enclaved Greek Cypriots to family life was seriously impeded on account of the measures imposed by the “TRNC” authorities to limit family reunification. Thus, it was not disputed by the respondent Government in the proceedings before the Commission that Greek Cypriots who permanently left the northern part of Cyprus were not allowed to return even if they left a family behind (see paragraph 29 above). Although arrangements were introduced by the “TRNC” authorities to facilitate to a limited extent family visits in 1998, the period under consideration for the purposes of the instant application was characterised by severe limitations on the number and duration of such visits. Furthermore, during the reference period schoolchildren from northern Cyprus attending schools in the south were not allowed to return permanently to the north after having attained the age of 16 in the case of males and 18 in the case of females. It is also to be observed that certain restrictions applied to the visits of those students to their parents in the north (see paragraph 43 above).

293.  In the Court’s opinion, the imposition of these restrictions during the period under consideration as a matter of policy and in the absence of any legal basis resulted in the enforced separation of families and the denial to the Greek-Cypriot population in the north of the possibility of leading a normal family life. In the absence of any legal basis for these restrictions, the Court does not have to consider whether the interferences at issue can be justified with reference to the provisions of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. For the same reason it does not have to consider either whether aggrieved individuals could have been expected to exhaust domestic remedies to challenge what in effect amounts to an administrative practice of interference with the right to respect for family life.

294.  As to the alleged interferences with the right of the enclaved Greek Cypriots to respect for their private life and home, the Court notes that the Commission found it established on the evidence that, during the period under consideration, this community was in effect monitored in respect of its contacts and movements (see paragraph 287 above), Greek Cypriots having to account to the authorities for even the most mundane of reasons for moving outside the confines of their villages. The Court further notes that the surveillance effected by the authorities even extended to the physical presence of State agents in the homes of Greek Cypriots on the occasion of social or other visits paid by third parties, including family members.

295.  The Court considers that such highly intrusive and invasive acts violated the right of the Greek-Cypriot population in the Karpas region to respect for their private and family life. No legal basis for these acts has been adduced, less so any justification which could attract the provisions of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. They were carried out as a matter of practice. As such, no question as to the exhaustion of local remedies arises in the circumstances.

296.  Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of the right of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus to respect for their private and family life and to respect for their home, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.

297.  The Court further notes that the applicant Government contest the Commission’s finding that it has not been established that during the period under consideration the correspondence of the enclaved Greek Cypriots was intercepted or opened as a matter of administrative practice. Having regard to its own assessment of the evidence, the Court considers that the applicant Government’s challenge to the Commission’s conclusion cannot be sustained. It observes that the evidence does bear out that in certain cases persons at the Ledra Palace crossing-point were searched for letters. However, the evidence before it does not substantiate to the required standard the allegation that such searches were carried out as a matter of administrative practice; nor does it support the view that there was a consistent practice of tapping telephone calls made to and from the homes of Greek Cypriots.

298.  In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that no violation of Article 8 of the Convention has been established by reason of an alleged practice of interference with the right of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus to respect for their correspondence.

299.  The Court notes that the applicant Government do not dispute the Commission’s decision to examine globally the living conditions of Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus from the standpoint of Article 8. They do, however, request the Court to isolate from that examination a number of alleged specific interferences with the right to respect for private life and to rule separately on their merits (see paragraphs 283-86 above). In the Court’s opinion, the matters relied on by the applicant Government in this connection are in reality bound up with their more general allegation that the respondent State pursues a policy which is intended to claim the northern part of Cyprus for Turkish Cypriots and settlers from Turkey to the exclusion of any Greek-Cypriot influence. The applicant Government maintain that this policy is manifested in the harshness of the restrictions imposed on the enclaved Greek-Cypriot population. For the Court, the specific complaints invoked by the applicant Government regarding impediments to access to medical treatment and hindrances to participation in bi- or inter-communal events (see paragraphs 216-227, 257 and 283 above) are elements which fall to be considered in the context of an overall analysis of the living conditions of the population concerned from the angle of their impact on the right of its members to respect for private and family life.

300.  In this connection the Court cannot but endorse the Commission’s conclusion at paragraph 489 of its report that the restrictions which beset the daily lives of the enclaved Greek Cypriots create a feeling among them “of being compelled to live in a hostile environment in which it is hardly possible to lead a normal private and family life”. The Commission noted in support of this conclusion that the adverse circumstances to which the population concerned was subjected included: the absence of normal means of communication (see paragraph 45 above); the unavailability in practice of the Greek-Cypriot press (see paragraph 45 above); the insufficient number of priests (see paragraph 47 above); the difficult choice with which parents and schoolchildren were faced regarding secondary education (see paragraphs 43-44 above); the restrictions and formalities applied to freedom of movement, including, the Court would add, for the purposes of seeking medical treatment and participation in bi- or inter-communal events; the impossibility of preserving property rights upon departure or on death (see paragraph 40 above).

301.  The Court, like the Commission, considers that these restrictions are factors which aggravate the violations which it has found in respect of the right of the enclaved Greek Cypriots to respect for private and family life (see paragraph 296 above). Having regard to that conclusion, the Court is of the view that it is not necessary to examine separately the applicant Government’s allegations under Article 8 concerning the implantation of Turkish settlers in northern Cyprus (see paragraph 285 above).

2.  Article 3 of the Convention
302.  The applicant Government alleged that, as a matter of practice, Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas area of northern Cyprus were subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, in particular discriminatory treatment amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment.

303.  They submitted that the Court should, like the Commission, find that Article 3 had been violated. The applicant Government fully endorsed the Commission’s reasoning in this respect.

304.  The Commission did not accept the respondent Government’s argument that it was prevented from examining whether the totality of the measures impugned by the applicant Government, including those in respect of which it found no breach of the Convention, provided proof of the pursuit of a policy of racial discrimination amounting to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The Commission had particular regard in this connection to its report under former Article 31 in the East African Asians v. the United Kingdom case adopted on 14 December 1973 (Decisions and Reports 78-A, p. 62). Having regard to the fact that it found the Convention to be violated in several respects, the Commission noted that all the established interferences concerned exclusively Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus and were imposed on them for the very reason that they belonged to this class of persons. In the Commission’s conclusion, the treatment complained of was clearly discriminatory against them on the basis of their “ethnic origin, race and religion”. Regardless of recent improvements in their situation, the hardships to which the enclaved Greek Cypriots were subjected during the period under consideration still affected their daily lives and attained a level of severity which constituted an affront to their human dignity.

305.  The Court recalls that in its Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 May 1985 (Series A no. 94), it accepted the applicants’ argument that, irrespective of the relevance of Article 14, a complaint of discriminatory treatment could give rise to a separate issue under Article 3. It concluded on the merits that the difference of treatment complained of in that case did not denote any contempt or lack of respect for the personality of the applicants and that it was not designed to, and did not, humiliate or debase them (p. 42, §§ 90-92).

306.  The Court further recalls that the Commission, in its decision in the above-mentioned East African Asians case, observed, with respect to an allegation of racial discrimination, that a special importance should be attached to discrimination based on race and that publicly to single out a group of persons for differential treatment on the basis of race might, in certain circumstances, constitute a special affront to human dignity. In the Commission’s opinion, differential treatment of a group of persons on the basis of race might therefore be capable of constituting degrading treatment when differential treatment on some other ground would raise no such question (loc. cit., p. 62, § 207).

307.  With these considerations in mind the Court cannot but observe that the United Nations Secretary-General, in his progress report of 10 December 1995 on the “Karpas Brief” (see paragraph 36 above), stated that the review carried out by UNFICYP of the living conditions of the Karpas Greek Cypriots confirmed that they were the object of very severe restrictions which curtailed the exercise of basic freedoms and had the effect of ensuring that, inexorably, with the passage of time, the community would cease to exist. He made reference to the facts that the Karpas Greek Cypriots were not permitted by the authorities to bequeath immovable property to a relative, even the next-of-kin, unless the latter also lived in the north; there was no secondary-school facilities in the north and Greek-Cypriot children who opted to attend secondary schools in the south were denied the right to reside in the north once they reached the age of 16 in the case of males and 18 in the case of females.

308.  The Court notes that the Humanitarian Review reflected in the “Karpas Brief” covered the years 1994-95, which fall within the period under consideration for the purposes of the complaints contained in the present application. It recalls that the matters raised by the United Nations Secretary-General in his progress report have, from the perspective of the Court’s analysis, led it to conclude that there have been violations of the enclaved Greek Cypriots’ Convention rights. It further notes that the restrictions on this community’s freedom of movement weigh heavily on their enjoyment of private and family life (see paragraphs 292-93 above) and their right to practise their religion (see paragraph 245 above). The Court has found that Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention have been violated in this respect.

309.  For the Court it is an inescapable conclusion that the interferences at issue were directed at the Karpas Greek-Cypriot community for the very reason that they belonged to this class of persons. The treatment to which they were subjected during the period under consideration can only be explained in terms of the features which distinguish them from the Turkish-Cypriot population, namely their ethnic origin, race and religion. The Court would further note that it is the policy of the respondent State to pursue discussions within the framework of the inter-communal talks on the basis of bi-zonal and bi-communal principles (see paragraph 16 above). The respondent State’s attachment to these principles must be considered to be reflected in the situation in which the Karpas Greek Cypriots live and are compelled to live: isolated, restricted in their movements, controlled and with no prospect of renewing or developing their community. The conditions under which that population is condemned to live are debasing and violate the very notion of respect for the human dignity of its members.

310.  In the Court’s opinion, and with reference to the period under consideration, the discriminatory treatment attained a level of severity which amounted to degrading treatment.

311.  The Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in that the Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas area of northern Cyprus have been subjected to discrimination amounting to degrading treatment.

3.  Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3
312.  The applicant Government stated that, notwithstanding the Commission’s conclusion on their complaint under Article 3, a conclusion which they endorsed, the Court should give separate examination to the discriminatory measures imposed on, and exclusively on, Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus from the standpoint of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention. The applicant Government submitted that, since the enclaved Greek Cypriots were victims of unreasonable and unjustified differences in treatment based on racial and religious grounds, the fundamental principle underlying Article 14 was violated as a matter of practice. They contended that the elements of discrimination included the pattern of restrictions and pressures which constituted the policy of ethnic cleansing in the Karpas region; the respondent State’s policy of demographic homogeneity; the continuing violations of Greek-Cypriots’ property rights as a consequence of the systematic implantation of settlers; the restrictions on the movement of displaced Greek Cypriots as a facet of ethnic exclusiveness; the transfer of possession of the property of displaced Greek Cypriots forced to leave the Karpas region to Turkish settlers; and the continued deprivation of possessions of Greek Cypriots located within the Turkish-occupied area.

313.  The Commission, for its part, did not find it necessary, in view of its finding on the applicant Government’s Article 3 complaint, to consider the instant complaints also in the context of the respondent State’s obligations under Article 14.

314.  The Court agrees with the Commission’s conclusion. Having regard to the reasoning which underpins its own finding of a violation of Article 3 it considers that there is no need to pronounce separately on what is in reality a restatement of a complaint which is substantially addressed in that finding.

315.  The Court concludes therefore that, in view of its finding under Article 3 of the Convention, it is not necessary to examine whether during the period under consideration there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 in respect of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus.

4.  Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with other relevant Articles
316.  The applicant Government requested the Court to find that the respondent State’s policies towards the enclaved Greek Cypriots involved violations of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with the relevant provisions. They submitted that the population concerned was discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under these provisions on racial, religious and linguistic grounds.

317.  The Court considers that, having regard to the particular circumstances of this case, it is not necessary to examine whether during the period under consideration there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with the other relevant Articles.

D.  Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention
318.  The applicant Government contended that, both as a matter of law and practice, the respondent State failed to provide an effective remedy before a national authority which complied either with Article 6 or other requirements which would bring the remedy into line with the requirements of Article 13.

319.  The applicant Government invoked Article 13 of the Convention in support of their allegations that Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus were denied any opportunity to contest interferences with their rights, including by private persons acting with the acquiescence or encouragement of the “TRNC” authorities.

320.  The applicant Government did not dispute the Commission’s finding of a violation of Article 13 with respect to the interferences by the “TRNC” authorities with the rights of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus under Articles 3, 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1.

321.  However, in the applicant Government’s view, the Commission had erred in its conclusions that, in respect of interference by private persons with the rights of the enclaved Greek Cypriots to respect for their home (Article 8) and property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1), Article 13 had not been violated. The applicant Government emphasised that these conclusions overlooked, firstly, the inadequacies of “TRNC” courts from the standpoint of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention (see paragraphs 83-85 above) and, secondly, the evidentiary test for establishing the existence of an administrative practice of violation of Convention rights (see paragraph 114 above). As to the latter point, the applicant Government maintained that, rather than examining whether there was “substantial evidence” before it which pointed to a pattern or system of non-investigation of criminal acts against the population concerned, and it clearly did, the Commission had wrongly focused on whether there were effective remedies available to aggrieved persons before the “TRNC” courts. The applicant Government contended that the Commission had failed, in particular, to take account of the fact that there was a failure, imputable to the respondent State, to provide effective remedies through tolerance by the authorities of repeated acts of criminality against the homes and property of the Greek-Cypriot population and that failure could not be condoned on the misconceived assumption that the “TRNC” courts existed as a means of redress.
For this reason, the applicant Government requested the Court to declare that Article 13 of the Convention had also been violated in respect of trespass and damage to property by private persons and interferences by them with the right to respect for the home of Greek Cypriots.

322.  The Commission recalled its conclusion in respect of the applicant Government’s complaint under Article 6 of the Convention (see paragraphs 230-32 above) as well as its decision to consider the issue of whether an effective remedy within the meaning of former Article 26 could be considered to exist in respect of the different allegations advanced by the applicant Government (see paragraphs 86-88 above). With that in mind, the Commission concluded that there had been no violation of Article 13 in respect of interferences by private persons with the rights of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus under Articles 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, whereas there had been a violation of Article 13 in respect of interferences by the authorities with their rights under Articles 3, 8, 9, and 10 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1.

323.  The Court agrees with the Commission’s conclusion. It recalls that it has analysed in respect of the various allegations advanced by the applicant Government whether the persons concerned had available to them remedies which were sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice and whether there were any special circumstances which might be considered to absolve them from the requirement to exhaust them (see paragraph 99 above). In so doing, the Court has had regard to the burden of proof and how it is distributed between the parties in respect of the exhaustion rule (see paragraph 116 above). In the absence of the respondent Government in the proceedings before it, the Court has had especial regard to the oral and written evidence adduced in the case and has taken due account of the applicant Government’s submissions raising points and evidence on which they disagree with the Commission’s findings, including the existence of domestic remedies.

324.  Notwithstanding the applicant Government’s objections to certain of the Commission’s conclusions, the Court is led to reaffirm on the evidence its earlier conclusions, which, it recalls, reflect those of the Commission. These are summarised below.
Firstly, the Court finds that no violation of Article 13 of the Convention has been established in respect of interferences by private persons with the rights of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It recalls in this respect that it has not been shown on the evidence that during the period under consideration there was an administrative practice on the part of the “TRNC” authorities of condoning acts of criminality against the homes and property of the enclaved Greek-Cypriot population; nor has it been shown to the same standard of proof that there was an administrative practice of denying aggrieved persons access to a court to assert rights in this connection. In the proceedings before the Commission, the respondent Government produced evidence in support of their contention that court remedies were available and highlighted the successful claims brought by a number of Greek-Cypriot litigants. While observing that neither Article 6 nor Article 13 of the Convention guarantee a successful outcome to an applicant in court proceedings, the Court considers that the applicant Government have failed to rebut the evidence laid before the Commission that aggrieved Greek Cypriots had access to local courts in order to assert civil claims against wrongdoers.
Secondly, it finds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in respect of interferences by the authorities with the rights of Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus under Articles 3, 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1. These interferences resulted from an administrative practice of violating the rights at issue; no remedies, or no effective remedies, were available to aggrieved persons.

VI.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF DISPLACED GREEK CYPRIOTS TO HOLD ELECTIONS

325.  The applicant Government, in the proceedings before the Commission, claimed that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated in that displaced Greek Cypriots were prevented from effectively enjoying the right freely to elect representatives in the Cyprus legislature in respect of the occupied territory. The applicant Government did not pursue this complaint before the Court either in their written or oral submissions.

326.  The Court, while noting that the Commission did not find on the merits that the provision in question had been violated, does not consider it necessary to examine the complaint, having regard to the fact that the complaint has not been pursued by the applicant Government.

327.  The Court concludes, accordingly, that it is not necessary to examine of its own motion whether the facts disclose a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.